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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

,STATE OF UT'AH
1\IARGARET REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 8405

W. VV. CLYDE & CO., a corporation,
and FRED GRAY,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth in the .appellant's
brief, recites many facts which we deem wholly irrelevant and immaterial to the issues raised by this appeal,
and omits to mention certain facts favorable to the defendants to which we believe the attention of the court
should be directed.
e refer to the parties as they appeared in the court below.

'V

The only real issue at trial w.as whether the accident
happened as claimed by the plaintiff, or as related by
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the defendant Gray. The facts out of which the case
arises are as follows:
During the summer of 1953, the defendant W. W.
Clyde & Co. (hereinafter referred to as Clyde) h.ad a
contract for certain road construction work west of U. S.
Highway 91, near Beck's Hot Springs. (R. 4, 7, t:~4.)
(Ex. 6.) In performing this work, it was necessary that
Clyde's trucks haul dirt and fill material from the east
side of the highway to the west side of the highway.
(R. 145). By the ter1ns of its contract, with the State
Road Commission, Clyde was required to provide flagmen to protect traffic from the danger of accident presented by heavy trucks passing back and forth across
U.S. IIighway 91. (R. 146, Ex. 6)
Pursuant to this contractual requirement, Clyde employed the defendant Gray and one Harry Gallo to act
as flagmen at the intersection. (R. 95-96, 112-113, 147).
Gray was stationed on the east side of the highway and
south of the intersection, and it was his duty to halt
north bound traffic on Highw.ay 91 when Clyde's trucks
were approaching or crossing the highway. (R. 102, 148).
Gallo was stationed on the west side of the highway,
north of the intersection, and he had the duty of halting
south bound traffic under the same circumstances.· (R.
113). Their employment with Clyde commenced on
August 3, 1953 (R. 95, 101).
During the summer of 1953, the plaintiff, who
resided in Salt L.ake City, was employed at a real estate
office in Bountiful. (R. 16-17). It was her practice to
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drive back and forth between Salt l~ake and Bountiful
and she made this trip at least twice, and some times
four times a day, in traveling between her home and her
office. (R. 18). She was thoroughly fan1iliar with the
highway, and with the fact that flagmen were stationed
there to halt traffic when trucks were crossing the highway. (R. 18.)
On the morning of September 17, 1953, the plaintiff was involved in an accident with the flagman Gray
(R. 20). According to the plaintiff's version of the accident, the plaintiff was proceeding in the most easterly
lane of traffic in a northerly diree;tion, and a.s she approched the flagman's position, and even before she could
see him, she slowed down, anticipating that she might be
flagged (R~ 19). There was another car preceding her
at a distance of three to four car lengths, in the same
lane of traffic (R. 19). She observed the flagman
waving a red flag in a plane parallel with the road or
his body, and she observed the car preceding her pass
by the flagman without event. (R. 20.) She construed
the action of the flagn1an as a signal to proceed forward,
and she started to accelerate (R. 20). As she passed
the flagman, he raised his flag and violently struck the
side windovv of her automobile, at the same time uttering a loud yell. (R. 20). This caused the glass to shatter,
and the noise and excitement so confused the plaintiff,
that she temporarily lost control of her car, during which
interval, it crossed over the center of the highway and
into the lane of traffic for south bound traffic. (R. 21).
She recognized her position of peril, and swerved her
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automobile back to the right side of the road. (R. 21).
In so doing, she twisted her back in such fashion as to
injure it quite severely.
Defendant Gray's version of the accident is entirely
different. According to his testimony, he had halted
the cars in the easterly lane of traffic, and had stepped
in front of them, and approximately on the line separating the two lanes of north bound traffic, and was attempting to halt traffic in the number two lane, or the
north bound lane nearest the center of the highway. (R.
105, 106, 110). His flag was held in his right hand and
was waved up and down in a plane between his waist and
his head. (R. 106). His left arm was also extended upward. While he was so engaged in signalling the north
bound traffic, the plaintiff "run through my flag," and
so close to him, that it was necessary for him to step
back in order to avoid being struck by her car. (R. 106,
109, 110). He was not certain whether his flag came in
contact with her car, but if it did, it was purely accidental
and unintentional on his part. (R. 101, 106, 109).
He also observed that the plaintiff drove down the
road a short distance, stopped on the right hand edge,
and got out of her car. (R. 107, 109). The plaintiff and
Gray agree that nothing was said by either to the other.
(R. 77, 105, 107). Admittedly neither the plaintiff nor
her husband ever made any complaint to Clyde (R. 79),
and the first notice that it ever received of the claimed
accident was when suit was filed.
The plaintiff commenced her action in three counts.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
(R. 1-5). Her first count was based on the theory of
assault, (R. 1-2) ; her second count was based on the
theory of negligence on the part of the defendant Clyde
in employing a person of known vicious propensities,
(R. 2, 4-5) ; and the third count was based on simple
negligence in conducting the flagging operations. (R.
2-3). During the trial of the case, the plaintiff's attorney abandoned the first and second counts, and it was
stipulated that they .might be withdrawn from the consideration of the jury (R. 117). The case was submitted
to the jury on the issue of the defendants' negligence
(third count), and the plaintiff's contributory negligence,
and the jury returned a verdict favorable to the defendants, no cause of action, (R. 203), upon which judgment
was duly entered. (R. 204).
The only eye witnesses to the accident who testified
at the trial, vvere the plaintiff and the defendant Gray.
The plaintiff called other witnesses who testified as to
the manner in which Gr.ay had signalled at various times
not involved in this suit, and in rebuttal the defendants
called witnesses to testify as to the manner in which he
had performed his duties as a flagman during the fall
of 1953. Essentially all that is involved, and all that the
jury had to determine, vvas whether it believed the testimony of the plaintiff, that the defendant deliberately
struck the window of her automobile after signalling her
to proceed forward; or whether it believed the testimony
of the defendant Gray, that the plaintiff ran through
his flag .at a time when he was signalling for her to halt.
The conflict in the testimonies of the two witnesses was
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sharp and clear. Each was a party to the action, and
interested in its outcome. The jury observed the appearance and conduct of both of them, from which it
determined either:
(a) That the evidence was in equipoise, and therefore the plaintiff had failed to sustain her burden of
proof of negligence on the part of the defendants; or
(b) That the testimony of Gray was the more
credible, and that the defendants were not guilty of any
negligence; or
(c) That plaintiff was negligent in attempting to
drive through or past Gray's signal flag.
The verdict being in favor of the defendants, they
are entitled to have the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, considered in the light most favorable to them.

STATEMENT OF POINT'S
POINT I.
THERE WAS A CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE WHICH
CREATED A QUESTION OF FACT FOR DETERMINATION
BY THE JURY.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTI:ON FO·R NEW
TRIAL.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS A CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE WHICH
CRE.A:TED A QUESTION OF FACT FOR DETERMINATION
BY THE JURY.

Plaintiff contends that the evidence compels a finding in her favor. In other words, as a matter of law, the
defendants were guilty of negligence which proximately
caused the plaintiff's injuries, and the plaintiff w.as herself, as a matter of la1v, free of contributory negligence.
Significantly, the plaintiff has failed to cite a single
authority-, statute, case or text,-in support of her
position. The lavv to the contr.ary is so well settled as
to be axiomatic. It finds its origin in the ancient con1n1on law, the Constitution of this State, and an unbroken
line of decision from this Court, extending back to territorial days. It would be a work of superrogation, even
to cite all of the deciBions of this court dealing with the
question. Suffice it to s.ay, that the rule has been reiterated countless times, and while the rule is almost as
old as the jury system itself, it lives today not only with
undiminished vitality, but perhaps in unsurpassed vigor.
The following quotations from some very recent decisions of this court, suffice to illustrate:
The language of Mr. Justice Crockett, speaking for
the court in the case of Weenig Bros., Inc., v. Manning,
(Ut.), 262 Pac. 2d 491, is particularly apropos to the
facts of this case:
"In order to upset the judgment and command one in its favor, the first obstacle plaintiff
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must overcome is to demonstrate that the evidence shows with such certainty that reasonable
minds could not differ thereon that the defendant
was guilty of negligence which proximately caused
the collision. In the absence of such degree of
proof we could not direct that such finding be
made and reverse decision of the lower court.
The defendant having prevailed, on conflicting
matters the evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to him."
In the case of Green vs. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, (U t.), 284 Pac. 2d 695, this court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Worthen, stated the rule thusly:
"This being a law action the question is not
whether the evidence would have supported a
judgment in favor of appellant but whether the
judgment entered by the trial court finds support
in the evidence.
"The trial judge saw and heard the witne,sses
and was in a better position than we to properly
evaluate it and to pass on their credibility."
Mr. Justide Wade, speaking for this court in the
case of Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Gutherie, (Ut.), 256 Pac.
2d 706, said :
"It needs no citation of authority that this
court will not redetermine facts found by the fact
finder in the lower court in law cases if in the
light most favorable to the respondent the evidence is sufficient to sustain such findings."
And in the recent case of Coombs v. Perry, (Ut.),
275 Pac. 2d 580, again speaking through Justice Crockett, this court said :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
"The plaintiff having won a judgment below,
the verdict is protected by a bulwark of rules
firmly established in our law. First, by the general proposition that the judgment and proceedings in the lower court are presumptively correct
with the burden upon defendant to show error.
Second, where a trial judge has passed upon a
question and a jury, presumably fair and imp.artial, has made a finding, while such is not controlling, it is at least entitled to some consideration and should not be wholly ignored in reviewing the situation and attempting to see, as objectively as possible, whether reasonable n1inds
might so conclude. Third, that the court must
review the evidence, together with every inference fairly arising therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and similarly, must consider any lack or failure of evidence in the same
light, which \Ve do in reviewing the facts here."
Reasons for the rule were further amplified in the
case of Gittens v. Lu,ndberg, (Ut.), 284 Pac. 2d 1115,
where this court said:
"It is the duty of this court to leave the question of credibility of witnesses to the jury or fact
trier and we have quite consistently adhered to
that policy. As has often been said, the jury is
in a favored position to form impressions as to
the trust to be reposed in witnesses. They have
the advantage of fairly close personal contact; the
opportunity to observe appearance and general
demeanor; and the chance to feel the impact of
personalities. All of which they may consider in
connection with the reactions, manner of expression, and apparent frankness and candor or want
of it in reacting to and answering questions on
both direct and cross-examination in determin-
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ing whether, and· to what extent, witnesses are
to be believed. ·Whereas, the appellate court is
handicapped by being limited to a review of an
impersonal record.

" * * * The jury may evaluate the testimony
of witnesses and accept those parts which they
deem credible, even though th·ere be some inconsistencies. An examination of the record here
·does not show that facts testified to would be impossible in the light of known physical facts, or
so contradictory or uncertain as to justify a conclusion that any -of the witnesses were entirely
'unworthy of belief' as plaintiff contends."
The principles above stated are illustrated and reiterated in the following recent decisions of this court:

Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., of Portsmouth, (Ut.), 232· Pac. 2d 754; Garret Freig·ht Lines v.
Cornwall, (Ut.), 232 Pac. 2d 786; Lowder v. Holley,
(Ut.) 233 Pac. 2d 350; American Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee,
(Ut.), 235 Pac. (2d) 361; Beagley v. U. 8. Gypsum Co.,
(Ut.), 235 Pac. 2d 783; Morris v. Russell, (Ut ..), 236 Pac.
2d 451; Toomer's Estate v. [1. P. R. Co., (Ut.), 239 Pac.
2d 163; Seybold v. U. P.R. Co., (Ut.), 239 Pac. 2d 174;
Pottlsen v. Manness, et al., (Ut.), 241 Pac. 2d 152; McCollum v. Clothier, (Ut.), 241 Pac. 2d 468; M. 8. T. & T.
Co. v. Consol. Freight Ways, (Ut.), 242 Pac. 2d 563;
Tuttle v. P. I. E. Co., (Ut..), 242 Pac. 2d 764; Gen. Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Lewis, (Ut.), 243 Pac. 2d 433; Buckley v.
Cox, (Ut.), 2·47 Pac. 2d 277; Great Am. Indem. Co. v.
Ber~yessa, (Ut.), 248 Pac. 2d 367; Parkinson v. 4-mundson, (Ut.), 250 Pac. 2d 944; Watkins v. Ut. Poultry &
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Farmers Coop., (Ut. ), 251 Pac. 2d 663; Stickle v. U. P. R.
Co., (Ut.), 251 Pac. 2d 867; Seamons v. Anderson, (Ut.),
252 Pac. 2d 208; Nichols v. Wall, (Ut.), 253 Pac. 2d 355;
'{hirteenth & Wash. Sts. Corp v. Neslen, (Ut.), 254 Pac.
2d 847; Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., (on rehearing), (Ut.),
259 Pac. 2d 294; Ladder v. Western Pac. R. Co., (Ut.),
259 Pac. 2d 588; Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., (Ut.), 261
Pac. 2d 927; Chamberlain v. Montgomery, (Ut.), 261 Pac.
(2d) 942; Beck v. Jeppsen, (Ut.), 262 Pac. 2d 760; Hillyard v. [lt. By-Products Co., (Ut.), 263 Pac. 2d 287; Roche
v. Zee, (Ut.), 264 Pac. 2d 855; Scoffield v. Sprouse-Reit.z
Co., (Ut)., 265 Pac. 2d 396; Wilson v. Oldroyd, (Ut.),
267 Pac. 2d 759; Hodges v. Waite, (Ut) ., 270 Pac. 2d
461; Jensen v. Taylor, (Ut.), 271 Pac. 2d 838; Nasser v.
Burton, (Ut.), 272 Pac. 2d 163; Kimball Elevator Co., Inc.,
v. Elevator Supp.lies Co., Inc., (Ut.), 272 Pac. 2d 583;
Staley v. Grant, (Ut.), 276 Pac. 2d 489; John C. Cutler
Assoc. v. DeJay Stores Inc., (Ut.), 279 Pac. 2d ·700;
Upton v. Heiselt Constr. Co., (Ut.), 280 Pac. 2d 97; Best
v. Huber, (Ut.), 281 Pac. 2d 208; Rogalski v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., (Ut.), 282 Pac. 2d 304; Lawrence v. Bamberger R. R. Co., (Ut.), 282 P.ac. 2d 325; Jensen v.
Mower, (Ut.), 294 Pae. 2d 683; Sprague v. Boyle Bros.
Drilling Co., (Ut.), 294 Pac. 2d 689; Winchester v. Egan
Farm Service, Inc., (Ut.), 288 Pac. 2d 790; Ray v. Consol. Freightways, (Ut.), 289 Pac. (2d) 196; Gaddis Inv.
Co. v. Morris on, (Ut.), 289 Pac. 2d 730; Price v. Price,
(Ut.), 289 Pac. 2d 1044; and Malstrom v. Consolidated
Theatres, Inc., (Ut.), 290 Pac. 2d 689.
Perhaps no principle has been better settled, or
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more often reiterated by this court within the past five
years, than that ordinarily questions of the defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence are for
the jury. Only where all reasonable minds must agree,
can it be held as a matter of law, that either party is
either free of, or guilty of, negligence, or that a verdict
should be directed in favor of either p.arty. The principle
is further illustrated by the following: Compton v. Ogden
Union Ry. & Depot Co., (Ut.), 235 P.ac. 2d 515; Wright
v. Maynard, (Ut.), 235 Pac. (2d) 916; Martin v. Steven:J,
(Ut.), 243 Pac. 2d 747; Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., (Ut.),
249 Pac. 2d 213; Morby v. Rogers, (Ut.), 252 Pac. (2d)
231; Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed Co., (Ut.), 265 Pac. 2d
1013; Bates v. Bu,rns, (Ut.), 281 Pac. 2d 209; Hewitt v.
Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., (Ut.), 284 Pac. 2d 471; and
Covington v. Carpenter, (Ut.), 294 Pac. 2d 788.
In light of the above principles we proceed to a
consideration of the contentions made by the plaintiff
on this app·eal.
It is not without significance that no motion for a
directed verdict was made by the plaintiff at the trial of
this case. The first time the plaintiff ever contended,
or even suggested, that she was entitled to a directed
verdict was upon her motion to set aside the verdict or
for a new trial. On this appeal she asserts that the jury
must h.ave found either that there was no incident at
all, or else that the app·ellant herself was guilty of conM
tributory negligence. The first suggestion deserves but
brief attention. In view of the fact that both parties
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admitted that an incident occurred, it certainly may not
be presumed that the jurors disregarded all of the evidence and their oaths of office, and made a finding
wholly unsupported by the evidence. However the jury
might well have found plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence, which finding is well supported by substantial evidence. As indicated in our statement of facts, the
verdict of the jury may be sustained on either of the
following three theories : (1) The plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proving that the defendants were
guilty of negligence; (2) the jury were convinced by the
evidence that the accident was not caused by any negligence on the part of the defendants; (3) that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence.
The plaintiff failed to offer .any evidence whatsoever, of negligence on the part of the defendants. Her
testimony, if believed, would prove an assault or battery,
but not negligence. But this theory was abandoned by
the plaintiff during the trial. She did nothing to carry
her burden of proof of negligence. The only evidence on
this subject came from the defendant Gray. According
to his testimony, he signalled the plaintiff's automobile
to stop, by waving a red flag in an arc from the height
of his shoulder to a point over the top of his head, at
the same time extending his left hand upward. The jury
could well have believed that such a signal was clear,
unambiguous and given in a prudent and proper manner,
free of any negligence whatsoever.
With respect to the problem of contributory negli-
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gence, the jury might well have believed that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, even though
they believed her own te·stimoney. As she approached
the scene of the accident, she anticipated that she might
be flagged. When the flagman Gray came into view, he
was standing at the edge of the road and waving his
flag. On previous occasions when she had passed by
this point, if the flagman did not intend to halt traffic,
he stood away from the road with his flag down. In this
instance, he was standing on the edge of the road and
waving his flag. In view of past experience, this, 'in
itself would be some indication that it was his intention
to halt traffic. The jury might well have believed that
under such circumstances, the. plaintiff should not have
proceeded by the flag until certain that it was the intention of the flagman that she should proceed. Of
course, if the jury believed the testimony of the defendant Gray, as they \vere entitled to do, they could
hardly escape finding the plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence since according to Gray'_s testimony, she "run
through my flag."
It may be conceded th.at the evidence would permit
a finding in favor of the plaintiff. That is not the issue
here. The jury found for the defendants, and the defendants are entitled to have the evidence, and every
reasonable inference therefrom, viewed in a light most
favorable to them~ If there is any evidence in the record,
upon which reasonable minds could find as the jury did
in this case, then the verdict may not be set aside by
this court. The jury had the opportunity, as this Court
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does not, of seeing the "ritnesses, noting their appearance and demeanor, and manner of testifying. From
these observations the jurors concluded that the defendants were not liable. The trial judge having had
the same opportunity for observation, refused to set
aside the verdict.
The position of defendants respecting Point I may
be vvell summarized by quoting from the opinion of Mr.
Justice Wade in the case of Horsley v. Robinson, (Ut.),
186 Pac. 2d 592, where it was said:
"Under a general verdict we cannot be assured what facts the jury found or that they found
the facts necessary to sustain their verdict. So
it is universally held under the common law system, as it must be in order to give stability to
jury verdicts, that the appellate court 1nust sustain the verdict where the evidence is sufficient
to support a finding of the necessary facts to
do so. Otherwise, the appellate court would be
required to reverse every verdict where in its
opinion the great preponderance of the evidence
is against .a finding of the necessary facts to support it, even though the evidence is such that reasonable minds might conclude from the evidence
that such necessary facts happened. To do so
would be to review the evidence no matter what
we call it. The question of what were the facts
and where is the preponderance of the evidence
is for the jury and not for the court to determine.
Our problem is only to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. In
doing so our standard is: Could a reasonable mind
be convinced by the evidence of the necessary
facts to support the verdict 1 If so, it must be
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sustained.
"That this court is not authorized to review
the facts found by the jury is expressly provided
by our Constitution, Article 8, Section 8, where it
is provided 'In cases at law the appeal shall be
on questions of law alone.' Since we cannot review the facts, whatever we think of where the
preponderance of the evidence is, is immaterial.
If we were to review the evidence and reverse
this case because we think the preponderance of
the evidence on a material issue is. against the
plaintiff, we do so in violation of that constitutional provision."
POINT II.
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FO·R NEW
TRIAL.

Plaintiff's position under her Point II is even
weaker than her argument under Point I. In the e:arly
case of Newton v. Brown, 2 Ut. 126, this court laid down
the rule of decision regarding motions for new trial,
based on insufficiency of the evidence, which has been,
followed ever since. '~l_lhis court there said:
"When the motion for a new trial is founded
upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict and judgment, a large discretion is
vested in the court below, in refusing or granting
the motion. It must plainly appear that this discretion has been abused before the Appellate
Court will interfere with this action in granting th·e motion upon this ground.
"In the case before us, the record shows that
the testimony was, to say the least, very conflictSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing, and in such cases the granting or refusing of
a new trial rests peculiarly in the discretion of the
court. * * *
"There w.as no abuse of discretion in this
case, and for this reason alone the judgment of
the court below should be affirmed."
In the later case of White v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. 8
U t. 56, 29 Pac. 1030, this court said:
"One of the grounds assigned in the motion
for new trial is that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain the verdict. There was a manifest conflict in the evidence. If the plaintiff is to be believed, he w.as entitled to recover. * * * The rule
is, when a motion is made for a new trial because
of the insufficency of the evidence, and the testimony is conflicting, the granting or refusing of
a new trial is largely in the discretion of the trial
court, and its act will not be overruled unless there
is a clear abuse of discretion."
The same principles were followed in Anderson v.
Salt Lake & 0. Ry. Co., (Ut.), 101 Pac. 579, and Lacina v.
Smith, (Ut.), 105 Pac. 914.
The rule was further expostulated 1n James v.
Robertson, 39 Ut. 414, 117 Pac. 1068, in the following
language:
"While the district court, in the exercise of
a sound legal discretion, without basing his ruling upon any specific error of law may, under certain circumstances, possess the authority to grant
a new trial, yet we cannot do so, nor can we
exercise the discretion which the district court
might, and in some cases perhaps ought to have
exercised. In cases like the one before us, where
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all other assignments fail, and the only available
assignment is ihat the evidence does not justify
the verdict of the jury, and where the trial court
has refused to grant a new trial, all that we
are authorized to do is to look into the evidence
to ascertain whether there is any substantial
evidence in support of every material element,
which plaintiff is required to establish in order
to recover. If there is such evidence, then, so far
as we are concerned, the verdict must stand, although in our judgment if we passed on the
facts, the verdict upon the whole evidence should
have been to the contrary. Nor can we, under the
guise of reviewing an abuse of d~iscretion by the
trial court in refusing to grant a new trial upon
the ground that the verdict is not supported by
the evidence, pass upon th~e weight of the evidence. What the district judge might, or even
should have done in this regard we may not do
for him, simply be·cause he refused to do it."
(Italics ours.)
It w.as further discussed in Va.liotis v. Utah-Apex
Mining Co., 55 Ut. 151, 184 Pac. 802, as follows:
"It is undoubtedly true, as counsel for appellant contends that the trial judge may and should
· set aside a verdict for insufficiency of the evidence and grant a new trial, whenever in his judgmen the verdict is clearly and palpably against
the weight of the evidence. Not to do so, would
be .an abuse of discretion. * * *
"But the trial judge ought not as a general
rule to disturb toh~e verdict if in his opinion there
is substantial evidence to support it. To set aside
the verdict in such case would be to invade the
province of the jury, in whom is vested the power
to decide all questions of fact and to whom all
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evidence thereon is to be addressed." (Italics
ours.)
The court further said:
"One of the obvious reasons therefor is that
the appellate court, limited to the examination
of the record merely, has not the advantage that
the trial judge has to judge such matters, having,
as he does, the witnesses before him and being
given the opportunity to see the witnesses, hear
their testimony; and observe their demeanor
while testifying. * * * To which we may add that,
by constitutional provision of this state, appeals
do not lie on questions of fact in law cases. Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 Pac. 980; Harris v. Laundry Co., 39 Utah, 436, 117 Pac. 700
Ann. Cas. 1913E, 96; Hill v. S. P. Co., 23 Utah,
94, 63 Pac. 814; Hoggan v. Cahoon, 31 Utah, 172,
87 P.ac. 164; Nelson v. S. P. Co., 15 Utah, 325,
49 Pac. 644; Anderson v. Mining Co., 15 Ut. 22,
49 Pac. 126; Connor v. Raddon, 16 Utah, 418, 52
Pac. 765.
"The granting or denial of a motion for new
trial founded on the insufficiency of the evidence
to justify the verdict, where the evidence is conflicting, rests in the sound legal discretion of
the trial judge, and the question directly involved
on appeal is whether or not that discretion has
been improperly exercised or abused. As said in
the case of Harrison v. Sutter St. R. Co., 116 Cal.
161, 47 Pac. 1020:
" 'That the granting of a new trial is a thing
resting so largely in the discretion of the trial
court that its action in that regard will not be
disturbed except upon the disclosure of a manifest and unmistakable abuse has become axiomatic
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and requires no citation of authority in its support. ' "
The court concluded as follows :
"This court has rep,eatedly held that the discretion of the trial court, exercised in granting
or refusing to grant a motion for new trial, based
on the insufficiency of t·he evidence to justify the
verdict, cannot be interfered with when, upon
examination o.f the evidence as disclosed by the
record, it is apparent that there is a substantial
conflict of evidence as to material issues of fact
in the case relative to which the insufficiency is
alleged.· In such a case this court must hold as
a matter of law that no abuse of discretion is
shown. * * *
* * * *
"It was a case of the credibility of witnesses,
substantially conflicting evidence and inferences
to be drawn therefrom concerning which fairminded men might reasonably entertain different
conclusions. * * * The judgment of the trial court
is therefore affirmed, with costs to the respondent." (Italics ours.)
To the same effect see Thompson vs. Brown Live
Stock Co., 74 Ut. 1, 276 Pac. 651.
In Brown v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Ut.), 290 Pac 769,
this court appropriately observed:
"The trial court, having seen and heard the
witnesses, did not feel justified, although it had
the power, to set aside the verdict because it was
against the evidence. We, who have only read
the record of the trial and proceedings, are asked
to say that the jury and the trial judge did not
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do their duty. This we are unwilling to do. The
appellant had a fair trial, and the trial court
committed no errors."
See also Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Ut. 347, 57 Pac.
2d 708; Chatelain v. Thackeray, (Ut.), 100 Pac. 2d 191;
and Bowers v. Gray, ( Ut.), 106 Pac. 2d 765.
The authorities were extensively reviewed in Moser
v. Z. C. M. I., (Ut.), 197 Pac. 2d 136, in a comprehensive
opinion wherein it was said:
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit
of any serious dispute (and appellants do not contend otherwise) that the question of granting or
denying a motion for new trial is a matter largely
within the discretion of the trial court. White v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Ut. 56, 29 P. 1030;
Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Ut. 606,
161 P. 50; Utah State National Bank v. Livingston, 69 Ut. 284, 254 P. 781; Thompson v. Brown
Live Stock Co., 74 Ut. 1, 276 P. 651; Jensen v.
Logan City, 89 Ut. 347, 57 P. 2d 708. This. rule
applies whether the motion is based upon insufficiency of the evidence or upon newly discovered
evidence. See cases above cited and V ali otis v.
Utah Apex Mining Co., 55 Ut. 151, 184 P. 802;
Greco v. Gentile, 88 Ut. 255, 53 P. 2d 1155; and
Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Ut. 457,
142 P. 2d 674. This court cannot substitute its
discretion for that of the trial court. James v.
Robertson, 39 Ut. 414, 117 P. 1068, 2 N.C.C.A.
782. We do not ordinarily interfere with rulings
of the trial court in either granting or denying a
motion for new trial, and unless abuse of, or
failure to exercise discretion on the part of the
trial judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling of
the trial judge will be sustained. Lehi Irrigation
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Co. v. Moyle, et al., 4 Ut. 327, 9 P. 867; vVhite
v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., supra; Utah State National Bank v. Livingston, and Trimble vs. 1Jnion
Pacific Stages, supra. * * *
"The rule in this jurisdiction, early laid down
by this court, is that where a motion for new trial
is based upon ,insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, the trial court will not be held
to have abused its discretion in denying th'e motion unless there is no substantial evidence in the
record to support the verdict. United States v.
Brown, 6 Ut. 115, 21 P. 461; James v. Robertson,
39 Ut. 414, 117 P. 1068, 2 N. C. C. A. 782. Therefore, if reasonable minds could have found as
the jury did in this case, from the evidence before it, then we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for new trial on the grounds of insufficiency
of the evidence to support the verdict." (Italics
ours.)
In concluding the court said:
"And the jury having determined this question in plaintiff's favor, and the trial court having denied defendants' motion for new trial, this
court cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion unless there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict, or in other words,
that all reasonable minds must agree that it was
plaintiff .and not defendant Rogers, who transgressed the center line of the highway." (Italics
ours.)
See also Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac R. Co., (Ut),
239 Pac. 2d 163.
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In Uptou;n Appliance & Radio Co., Inc. v. Flint, et
al., (Ut.), 249 Pac. 2d 826, this court said:
"Jury trials are a part of the fundamental
tenets of our judicial system and where, as in
this case a litigant has fully, completely, .and without restraint been permitted to show his full
grievance to a jury and they have conscientiously
and without any showing of prejudice or other
extraneous influences decided the matter there
must be some basic and compelling reason so
inherent in the evidence that the trial judge would
be warranted in placing his judgment as to the
result to be reached over and above that of the
JUry.

" ' A court, vacating a verdict and granting
a new trial by merely setting up his opinion or
judgment against that of the jury, but usurps
judicial power and prostitutes the constitutional
trial by jury.' Jensen v. Denver & Rio Gr.ande
Railroad Company, 44 Ut. 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192."
In Wilson v. Oldroyd, (Ut.), 267 Pac. 2d 759, this
court said:
"Because of their [Jury's] advantaged position courts are extremely reluctant to interfere
with their verdicts. This is necessarily so in order
that the Tight of trial by jury assured under our
law be preserved. If the courts were prone to
set aside jury verdicts and substitute their own
judgments therefor, whenever they disagreed vvith
the jury, the right would be .abrogated and the
jury system would be but a pretense. The concept of trial by jury necessarily presupposes that
there is a wide area within which the pendulum
of the jury's deliberations may swing without
interference from the court. And so long as they
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remain within the boundaries of what reasonable
minds could believe their findings should remain
inviolate.
"The validity of the verdict in the instant
case is reinforced by the fact that the trial judge
had given his approval by refusing to vacate or
modify it. As we stated in Geary v. Cain, ' * * *
in case of doubt, the deliberate action of the trial
court should prevail. Otherwise, this court will
sooner or later find itself usurping the functions
of both the- jury and the trial court, * * * ' "
The principles were reaffirmed in Coombs v. Perry,
275 Pac. 2d 580.
We have no quarrel with the decision of this court
in King v. U. P. Railroad Co., 221 Pac. 2d 892, cited
in the plaintiff's brief at page 13. However, nothing
therein contained adds anything to the position of the
plaintiff. All that that case hold is (in conformity with
well established precedent) that the trial judge may
grant a new trial on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence to warrant the verdict, where the evidence is conflicting, and where, in the judgment of the trial judge,
the weight of the evidence is against the verdict. But
here the trial court refused to upset the verdict. And
under the rules enunciated in the c.ases above cited and
discussed, such ruling may not be held to be an abuse
of discretion. On the contrary, the evidence being in
-conflict, as a matter of law the trial judge was not guilty
of an abuse of discretion. We can conclude our argument
under this point no better than by quoting the language
of this court in its most recent expression of opinion on
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the subject, in the case of Bowden v. D. & R. G. W. R. R.
Co., (Ut.), 286 Pac. 2d 240, where it was said:
"Ordinarily the trial court has a wide discretion in granting or denying motions for a new
trial, with which this court is reluctant to interfere, and will do so only if there is a clear abuse
of discretion. * * *

* * *

*

"We reaffirm our commitment that 'The right
of jury trial * ~ * is * * * a right so fundamental
and sacred to the citizen * * * (that it) should be
jealously guarded by the courts'. But once having been granted such right .and a verdict rendered, it should not be regarded lightly nor overturned without good and sufficient reason; nor
should a judgment be disturbed merely because
of error."
CONCLUSION
There was a conflict in the evidence, and the verdict
of the jury is amply supported by substantial evidence
in the record. There is no showing that the trial court
abused his discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for
.a new trial. The judgement should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN
& CHRISTENSEN
.Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents
1205 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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